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Abstract 
This paper challenges the institutional sclerosis view of the German crisis according to which 
rigid labour markets and generous welfare state institutions have driven Germany into its 
position as „Europe’s sick man“. In general, the view is not convincing, because the 
underlying hypotheses about the effects of labour market regulation and welfare state 
institutions on employment and growth cannot unambiguously be derived from modern labour 
market theory and are at least partially at odds with accepted empirical findings. In particular, 
the explanation is unconvincing, because in international comparison Germany’s labour 
market and welfare state institutions are simply not as sclerotic as often supposed. In most of 
the aggregate indicators for structural rigidities Germany is not worse than the average OECD 
or EU country. Moreover, there is a macroeconomic explanation focusing on the combined 
effects of restrictive and pro-cyclical monetary, fiscal and wage policies in Germany that is 
broadly consistent with modern macroeconomic theory and is supported by empirical data. What ever happened to Germany? 




Despite the general growth slowdown and the overall increase in unemployment since the mid 
1970s, Germany was usually considered to be an economy which coped more successfully 
with the macroeconomic shocks of the 1970s. Stable - although not above average - growth 
and, in particular, less unemployment in international comparison made some even term it 
“Model Germany”. This picture has changed profoundly since the mid 1990s. Whereas the 
unification boom in the early 1990s prolonged Germany’s upswing and prevented the 
economy from sliding into the world recession of 1991, Germany was then forced into a 
serious recession by the Bundesbank’s monetary policy in 1993 and did not manage to 
recover to previous strength in the following period. During the convergence process towards 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) and, in particular, since the Euro was introduced in 
1999 Germany’s growth has been falling behind and unemployment has increased to the 
European average.
1 From 2001 until present the German economy has been facing its most 
serious crisis in post-war history: GDP growth has come down from 2.9 percent in 2000, to 
0.8 percent in 2001, 0.2 percent in 2002 and 0.0 percent in 2003. And an expected real GDP 
growth rate of 1.4 percent for 2004 will only mean a weak recovery. The German economy 
seems to have stepped into an ongoing period of stagnation. Unemployment has been rising 
again and may soon reach its post war maximum. The budget deficit, though not excessively 
high in international comparison, has been rising despite strong consolidation efforts since 
2001. At the end of 2004 it will have exceeded the 3 percent (of GDP) deficit limit of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact for the third time in three consecutive 
years. This has already made the European Commission start the formal excessive deficit 
procedure which could in turn result in substantial fines for the German government. Of 
course, many other countries are currently facing economic problems, but in international 
comparison Germany has been hit much harder than most of the other countries. The former 
                                                           
* Very special thanks to Dean Baker, Andrew Glyn, David Howell und John Schmitt for generously supplying us 
with their complete data set from Baker et al. (2002). We would also like to thank Bernd Muelhaupt, Wade 
Jacoby and Torsten Niechoj for helpful comments on earlier versions and Barbara Schnieders for assistance with 
the data. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 The main source for macroeconomic data in this paper is OECD (2003). Until 1990 the German data only 
cover the former West Germany. Since 1991 the data are related to the now united West and East Germany.   2
   
                                                          
key currency country of the European Monetary System (EMS) has become “Europe’s Sick 
Man”. 
There has been a lively discussion about the reasons for the German crisis and about how to 
overcome it. With few exceptions, however, mainstream researchers seem to agree that 
institutional sclerosis, i.e. rigid and over-regulated labour markets and too generous welfare 
state institutions have driven Germany into crisis. Consequently, there are many who call for 
far reaching structural reforms, radical deregulation of the labour market and radical 
dismantling of the welfare state.
2 Alternative macroeconomic explanations and policy advice 
are hardly ever considered seriously and are often dismissed as pure attempts to prevent the 
(perceived) urgently necessary process of structural reforms. The proponents of radical 
deregulation have been politically successful to a considerable extent: After some reluctance 
during the first term of the red-green administration (1998-2002) chancellor Schroeder’s 
„Agenda 2010“ presented in March 2003 has made clear that the government is now 
determined to implement far reaching structural reforms to overcome the (perceived) 
institutional sclerosis (Schroeder, 2003). 
The purpose of the present paper is to fundamentally challenge the institutional sclerosis 
explanation of the German crisis. In general, the explanation is not convincing, because the 
underlying hypotheses about the effects of labour market regulation and welfare state 
institutions on employment and growth cannot unambiguously be derived from modern labour 
market theory and are at least partially at odds with accepted empirical findings. In particular, 
the explanation is unconvincing, because in international comparison Germany’s labour 
market and welfare state institutions simply are not as sclerotic as often supposed; in most of 
the aggregate indicators for structural rigidities Germany is not worse than the average OECD 
or EU country. Additionally there is a macroeconomic explanation focusing on the combined 
effects of too restrictive monetary policies, too restrictive and sometimes counter-cyclical 
fiscal policies and too moderate wage policies in Germany that is broadly consistent with 
modern macroeconomics and with empirical data. 
 
2 See for instance the annual reports of the German council of economic experts (SVR, 2002, 2003), the majority 
view in the bi-annual joint reports of the leading economic research institutes in Germany (Institute, 2002, 2003) 
and, in particular, an economic policy paper of the German central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2003). The 
OECD and IMF reports on the German and European economy also aim at structural reforms (IMF, 2003; 
OECD, 2003). The same is true for the European Commission (2002). For a critique of the institutional rigidity 
view of European unemployment see recently Schettkat (2003a) and Stockhammer (2004).   3
   
In this paper we will not explicitly address the problem of German unification and its effects 
on German stagnation. But it should be noted, that there is a substantial discrepancy in 
macroeconomic performance between West and East Germany in terms of GDP growth and 
unemployment. West Germany’s growth rates exceed those of East Germany since the mid 
1990s, i.e. the catch-up process of East Germany has virtually come to a stop since then, and 
East Germany’s unemployment rates are three times higher than those in West Germany. This 
situation causes eminent fiscal transfers from West to East in the dimension of three to four 
percent of German GDP. The macroeconomic effects of these transfers, however, cannot be 
easily assessed, so that we refrain from trying here due to a lack of space. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 draws a short picture of Germany’s economic 
problems with respect to growth, unemployment and public deficits, in order to identify the 
facts to be explained. Section 3 deals with the institutional sclerosis view. The economic 
theory behind the view is sketched, theoretical and empirical reasons are given why this 
theory is not very convincing in general before its particular weaknesses with respect to the 
German data are analysed. Section 4 presents the alternative macroeconomic explanation of 
German stagnation. The basic idea is explained and the key macroeconomic factors are 
defined. Comparing the German performance to the EMU average, it is demonstrated that 
restrictive and ill-coordinated macroeconomic policies can be made responsible for 
Germany’s falling behind. Section 5 sketches the economic policy implications of our 
findings. 
2. A look at the facts to be explained: Growth, unemployment and budget deficits since 
the mid 1990s 
A closer look at the annual German GDP growth rates from 1981 to 2003 in comparison with 
the average of the EMU countries’ growth rates reveals a long-term absolute and relative 
growth problem in Germany since the mid 1990s (Figure 1): 
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From 1981 until 1994 the German growth rates oscillate around the EMU average, but from 
1995 onwards, the German rate is systematically lower than the EMU average. As growth 
determines (ceteris paribus) employment,
3 there is a similar picture for the development of the 
unemployment rate (Figure 2). Since 1996 German unemployment has been decreasing more 
slowly or has been increasing faster than the EMU average. Whereas the German rate used to 
be substantially below the EMU average from 1981 until the mid 1990s, the difference has 
been decreasing since 1996 and has by now virtually disappeared. 
 
                                                           
3 In order to bring down the German unemployment rate, currently an annual GDP growth rate of slightly less 
than 2 percent is necessary. 
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The development is even more dramatic with respect to the budget deficit (Figure 3). Whereas 
Germany used to have budget deficits about two percentage points of GDP below the EMU 
average, there was a three year process of catching up by the EMU average from 1994 to 
1997. Since 2001 the German deficit has even considerably exceeded the EMU average. 
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A convincing explanation for Germany’s current economic problems thus has to be able to 
explain the systematic lagging behind of German growth rates in comparison with the EMU 
average since the mid 1990s. The development of the unemployment rate and the budget 
deficit can basically be seen as a consequence of the problem of slow growth. 
3. Institutional sclerosis as the cause of Germany’s economic problems? 
3.1 The institutional sclerosis view 
The institutional sclerosis view has its theoretical foundation in simple neoclassical labour 
market theory. The theoretical standard of reference is a complete and perfect neoclassical 
labour market. With such a standard of reference unemployment can only arise because of 
market imperfections preventing a market clearing real wage at full employment (Siebert, 
1997).
4 Institutions of collective wage bargaining, labour market regulation and the welfare 
state are seen as market imperfections and therefore creators of unemployment: 
•  Coordinated and/or centralised collective wage bargaining by trade unions and employers’ 
associations on the regional, sectoral or even national level lead to unemployment via 
excessive wages and an inadequate wage structure due to market power. 
•  Employment protection legislation raises firms’ labour costs leading to lower labour 
demand and thus higher unemployment. Utmost importance is often attached to the laws 
concerning protection against dismissals. The resulting higher dismissal and adaptation 
costs are said to prevent firms from hiring employees. 
•  The reservation wage set by the welfare state leads to unemployment. First, unemployment 
benefits and social benefits are seen to reduce the incentives of the unemployed to look for 
a new job thereby increasing search unemployment. Second, decreased competition 
because of lower job search activities and the „socialisation“ of the unemployment risk are 
said to reduce the trade unions’ incentives to behave responsibly in the process of wage 
bargaining, which in turn is said to raise wages and unemployment. 
•  Taxes on labour (payroll taxes, labour income tax, social security contributions and 
consumption taxes), the tax wedge, decrease the net wage thus lowering work incentives 
and the employees’ and trade unions’ inclination to accept wage moderation which in turn 
 
4 Note that in this approach, contrary to what has been stated in the previous section, it is unemployment which 
lowers the growth rate and not low growth which is responsible for rising unemployment.   7
   
                                                          
is believed to raise wages above the market clearing level and therefore the unemployment 
rate. 
From this theoretical point of view there is only one way to reduce unemployment: Reduce or 
better abolish the imperfections of the labour market, i.e. impede collective bargaining, 
deregulate the labour market and dismantle the welfare state as far as possible. Unleash the 
beneficial market forces and the labour market will start working well again. 
In order to render a good explanation for the German crisis, the institutional sclerosis view 
must obey to three conditions: First, it must be based on a consistent and realistic economic 
theory. Second, the derived theoretical relation between labour market regulation and welfare 
state institutions, on the one hand, and unemployment, on the other hand, should be confirmed 
by empirical studies. Third, in order to be applicable to the German case it must be shown, 
that German labour market and welfare state institutions are in fact as sclerotic as to fit to the 
German economic performance since the mid 1990s. In the following sections it will be 
shown that the institutional sclerosis view does not convincingly obey to any of the three 
conditions. 
3.2 Theoretical Doubts 
Once the traditional model of a complete neoclassical labour market as a standard of reference 
is abandoned and replaced by the models of modern labour market theory it becomes difficult 
to derive unambiguous implications concerning the employment effects of labour market 
regulation and welfare state institutions.
5 As soon as asymmetric information between 
employers and employees, incomplete contracts and active price-setting are taken into 
account there are good reasons to question the institutional sclerosis view and its economic 
policy implications. 
With respect to employment protection, it remains true that it raises firms’ labour cost, which 
leads to less hiring compared to a situation without employment protection (Jerger, 2003). 
However, if trade unions take into account that employment protection increases the stability 
of workers’ income and, therefore, demand lower hourly or daily wages, employment 
protection costs will in a sense be shifted to wages. As employment protection at the same 
time lowers employment fluctuation, the matching between jobs and employees can be 
improved leading to lower hiring and training costs. Additionally, long-term relations between 
 
5 See for instance Blanchard/Katz (1997), Layard/Nickell/Jackman (1991), Nickell/Layard (1999), Schettkat 
(2003), Snowdon/Vane/Wynarczyk (1994, pp. 292-318) and Stiglitz (1997, 2002).   8
   
employees and firms increase the incentives to invest into firm specific human capital which 
in turn raises productivity (Schettkat, 2003). Therefore the net employment effect of 
employment protection cannot be unambiguously derived from theory. It may have negative 
as well as positive effects. Theoretical considerations as well as some detailed empirical 
studies suggest that employment protection has no overall effect on unemployment, but that it 
at best influences the structure of unemployment. It seems to lower employment fluctuation 
and therefore decreases the share of short-term unemployment but increases the share of long-
term unemployment in total unemployment (Nickell, 1997; Nickell/Layard,1999; OECD, 
1999). 
In modern as well as traditional labour market theory the extent of replacement rates and the 
duration of unemployment and social benefits considered in isolation do increase wage 
pressure, both directly through providing a reservation wage and indirectly through reduced 
workers’ competition on the labour market. If, however, granting benefits is linked to active 
labour market policies improving job seekers’ qualification and mobility, competition will be 
increased and wage pressure will decrease (Nickell, 1997). Additionally, in incomplete labour 
markets a longer job search period may improve matching between jobs and employees, 
which in turn has positive effects on firm specific human capital accumulation and 
productivity growth (Schettkat, 2003). Therefore, the overall effect of the replacement rate 
and the duration of unemployment and social benefits on unemployment is theoretically 
ambiguous. 
It is true even for modern labour market theory that increasing union density and higher union 
coverage increase wage pressure and thus also the unemployment rate. However, a high 
degree of wage bargaining coordination makes it possible to take into account the 
macroeconomic effects of excessive wage demands which in turn reduces the unemployment 
rate (Nickell, 1997). Instead, uncoordinated wage bargaining runs into the danger of 
neglecting macroeconomic effects of rising wages in favour of sectoral or firm specific 
relative improvements of wages, thereby increasing inflationary pressures and unemployment 
in periods of low unemployment. The positive employment effect of wage bargaining 
coordination is by now widely accepted: A detailed study by the OECD (1997) comes to the 
conclusion that there is „(...) some tendency for more centralised/co-ordinated bargaining   9
   
                                                          
systems to have lower unemployment and higher employment rates compared with other, less 
centralised/co-ordinated systems“ (OECD, 1997, p. 64).
6
Finally, a high tax wedge will only lower labour demand and employment if it leads to higher 
wage pressure, i.e. if employees or trade unions try to compensate the taxes via higher wages 
(Nickell, 1997). This implies that taxes decrease labour supply through lower individual 
incentives to work. The effects of taxes on labour supply, however, are theoretically 
indeterminate and seem to be quite moderate empirically (Atkinson, 1999; 
Atkinson/Mogensen, 1993). 
3.3 Empirical doubts 
3.3.1 A first look at the data: simple correlations 
In order to study the relation between labour market and welfare state institutions empirical 
indicators for these institutions are needed. For the present paper the set of indicators 
compiled by Baker et al. (2002) is utilized. It is the most complete and up to date set 
comprising aggregate institutional data for 20 OECD countries for eight 5-year-periods from 
1960 to 1999. And it is an updated version of the set by Nickell et al. (2002) which is widely 
used in macroeconomic labour market research. 
As a first approximation we present six simple scatter plots relating the change in six relevant 
institutional indicators (index of employment protection, benefit replacement rate, benefit 
duration, union density, bargaining coordination and tax wedge)
7 to the corresponding change 
in the standardised unemployment rate for the four 5-year-periods from 1980 to 1999 in 13 
EU countries (Figures 4a-f). The period from 1980 to 1999 has been chosen, because it was 
the 1980s when the phenomenon of persistently high unemployment in some countries 
occurred for the first time. Around the same time some countries started with institutional 
reforms of the kind the present paper is concerned with.
8
 
6 On the interaction of wage bargaining co-ordination with the central bank’s monetary policy and the effects on 
unemployment see more extensively Hein (2002, 2002a). 
7 For a definition see table 1 in section 3.4. 
8 It should be noted, however, that the results remain essentially unchanged when the whole period from 1960 to 
1999 is studied.   10
Figure 4a: Change in the unemployment rate and in the index of employment protection, 
1980-99  (20 OECD countries, 4 five-year-periods)
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Source: Baker et al. (2002); authors' calculations.
Figure 4b: Change in the unemployment rate and in the benefit replacement rate, 
1980-99  (20 OECD countries, 4 five-year periods)
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Source: Baker et al. (2002); authors' calculations.
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Figure 4c: Change in the unemployment rate and in the index for benefit duration, 
1980-99  (20 OECD countries, 4 five-year periods)
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Source: Baker et al. (2002); authors' calculations.
Figure 4d: Change in the unemployment rate and in the trade union density, 
1980-99 (20 OECD countries, 4 five-year periods)
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Source: Baker et al. (2002); authors' calculations.
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Figure 4e: Change in the unemployment rate and in the index of wage bargaining coordination, 
1980-99  (20 OECD countries, 4 five-year periods)














-1,2 -1 -0,8 -0,6 -0,4 -0,2 0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1
































t-value = - 0,40
Source: Baker et al. (2002); authors' calculations.
Figure 4f: Change in the unemployment rate and in the tax wedge, 
1980-99 (20 OECD countries, 4 five-year periods)
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Source: Baker et al. (2002); authors' calculations.
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If there are countries that have managed to decrease unemployment by institutional reforms 
and others that have fallen behind due to a lack of such reforms, this should be reflected in the 
diagrams by a positive relation between institutional change and change in the unemployment 
rate. However, this is obviously not the case. The data points are extraordinarily dispersed 
with the regression lines explaining only a very small fraction of the total variance (low 
values for R
2). Only one of the regression lines (for union density) has a statistically 
significantly positive sign. All the others are statistically insignificant and almost zero or even 
negative. The deregulationists’ claims cannot, of course, be rejected by simple scatter plots. 
As a first approximation, however, they show that there is no clear, simple and obvious 
relationship between deregulation and unemployment. This result is maintained considering 
the level of institutional indicators and unemployment rates instead of the change in these 
variables. This has been shown for the same period by Baker. et al. (2002) for the 20 OECD 
countries in the data set and by Hein/Muelhaupt/Truger (2003) for the 13 EU countries in this 
data set. 
3.3.2 Econometric results from the literature 
What about empirical evidence from more complex econometric studies using multiple 
regressions? Since the fundamental work by Layard/Nickell/Jackman (1991) various other 
studies on this subject have been published. Using pooled cross-country regressions, these 
papers usually try to test whether the six institutional variables (index of employment 
protection, benefit replacement rate, benefit duration, union density, bargaining coordination 
and tax wedge) already introduced have a statistically significant effect on the unemployment 
rate in OECD countries. Sometimes additional or alternative institutional variables like the 
level of active labour market policies and the bargaining coverage rate are included in the 
regressions as well. The periods of observation usually cover the time span from the early 
1960s till the mid 1990s, in some of the studies only from the mid 1980s till the mid 1990s. 
Baker et al. (2002) provide a good overview of the more recent econometric studies which we 
will briefly sketch.
9
The results from this kind of work are rather mixed and not as clear as the proponents of 
deregulation like to claim: Only the tax wedge and benefit duration always have a 
significantly positive effect on unemployment when they are included as explanatory 
variables. Employment protection and the benefit replacement rate exert a positive influence 
 
9 They discuss Belot/van Ours (2001), Bertola/Blau/Kahn (2002), Blanchard/Wolfers (2000), 
Elmeskov/Martin/Scarpetta (1998), Nickell (1997) and Nickell et al. (2002).   14
   
                                                          
on unemployment in the majority of studies as well. For the replacement rate, however, in 
some studies the causality is not clear: It cannot be ruled out, that high replacement rates are a 
political response to persistently high unemployment rates. Furthermore, in most of the 
studies union density and union coverage are not found to significantly influence the 
unemployment rate. 
In striking contrast to the deregulationists’ view all the studies discussed by Baker et al. 
(2002) come to the result that the degree of wage bargaining coordination exerts a 
significantly and markedly negative influence on the unemployment rate. Moreover, half of 
the reviewed papers show a significantly negative effect of active labour market policies. In 
addition, macroeconomic shocks are found to be of considerable relevance for the explanation 
of unemployment in most empirical studies. Finally, in some of the papers country and time 
specific factors play an important part. 
The impression that econometric studies do not provide clear cut and unambiguous 
confirmation of the deregulationists’ views has been further strengthened by a recent IMF 
study using a panel of 20 OECD countries from 1960 to 1998 (IMF, 2003).
10 According to 
this study some institutional variables, namely employment protection, union density, benefit 
replacement rate and tax wedge, have the expected significantly positive effects on 
unemployment. However, the degree of wage bargaining coordination again has a 
significantly negative effect. Moreover, the unemployment rate depends strongly on its own 
evolution in the past (persistence) as well as on macroeconomic institutions and factors: The 
degree of central bank independence exerts a strongly positive influence on unemployment, 
which can, however, be reduced by effective wage bargaining coordination. And an increase 
in real interest rates as well as a slowdown in productivity growth lead to higher 
unemployment. 
While careful scrutiny of recent econometric studies already reveals that labour market and 
welfare state institutions can at best explain only a part of existing unemployment, Baker et al. 
(2002) have shown that those institutional effects that have been found are not very robust. 
Even small variations in the observation periods or the institutional indicators used in the 
regressions can dramatically change the signs of the institutional effects. This is demonstrated 
with respect to the influential work by Nickell (1997), where shortening the observation 
period by only two years and adapting the specification of institutional indicators to those in 
later works by the same author (Nickell et al., 2002) led to a complete collapse of the results: 
 
10 The study is based on updated data from Nickell et al. (2002).   15
   
Before the re-specification seven out of eight institutional variables had the expected 
significant sign, afterwards none of them was statistically significant and three even had 
completely unexpected signs: Employment protection, union density and the tax wedge were 
estimated to have negative effects on the unemployment rate! 
Last but not least, the ambiguity of econometric results is underlined by regressions Baker et 
al. (2002) ran using their data set for 20 OECD countries from 1960 to 1999. There 
employment protection is not statistically significant at all. Benefit replacement rate and 
duration are significant, but have a negative sign, i.e. the higher the benefit replacement rate 
and duration, the lower is the unemployment rate. The same applies for bargaining 
coordination. The tax wedge does not influence unemployment. Dummies for the five-year 
periods are significant and country specific effects are important as well. Finally, the 
macroeconomic situation, represented by the inflation rate, has a significantly negative effect 
on unemployment. Thus, on the basis of this study the deregulationists’ view cannot be 
confirmed at all. 
To sum it up, recent econometric studies do not provide clear and unambiguous results in 
favour of the institutional sclerosis view concerning „rigid“ labour markets, welfare state 
institutions and unemployment. A considerable part of the unemployment differences over 
time and between countries cannot be explained by differences in the institutional structures 
of the labour market. Rather time and country specific factors and macroeconomic variables 
have to be taken into account. Finally, some of the results actually found in favour of the 
institutional sclerosis view do not seem to be particularly robust. 
3.4 German labour market and welfare state institutions in international comparison 
Although neither the modern theoretical nor the recent empirical literature is in favour of a 
clear cut relation between institutional sclerosis and unemployment we will finally take a look 
at Germany’s labour market and welfare state institutions in international comparison in order 
to show that there is no clear relationship to the development of growth and unemployment 
sketched in section 2 of the paper. Table 1 lists the six institutional indicators (index of 
employment protection, benefit replacement rate, benefit duration, union density, bargaining 
coordination and tax wedge) for Germany taken from the data set by Baker et al. (2002) for 
eight five-year-periods from 1960 to 1999. It also shows the differences between the values 
for Germany and the average values for 20 OECD and 13 EU countries.   16
   





















1960-64  0.45 42.7 0,57 33,8  2,5  42,9 
1965-69  0.80 41.9 0,57 32,4  2,5  42,8 
1970-74  1.54 39.7 0,58 32,5  2,5  46,7 
1975-79  1.65 39.6 0,62 35,1  2,5  48,3 
1980-84  1.65 38.8 0,62 34,9  2,5  49,7 
1985-89  1.63 37.8 0,60 33,4  2,5  50,5 
1990-94  1.50 37.4 0,61 31,0  2,5  52,2 
1995-99  1.30 36.3 0,60 27,4  2,5  53,9 



















11) -0.34 17.1 0.22  -4.9  0.29 6.3
12)
1965-69 
11) -0.05 13.0 0.22  -6.7  0.29 1.7
13)
1970-74 
11) 0.55 7.0 0.19 -8.9 0.26  1.5
13)
1975-79  0.53 -0.1 0.21  -10.4  0.20 3.2 
1980-84  0.50 -5.0 0.18  -10.5  0.37 1.8 
1985-89  0.48 -8.9 0.15 -8.9 0.49 -0.3 
1990-94 0.41  -10.1  0.12  -9.7  0.49  0.2
14) 
1995-99  0.34 -11.1 0.09 -12.0 0.58 1.8
14)



















11) -0.31 17.3 0.20  -5.9  0.23  4.0 
1965-69 
11) -0.08 12.2 0.22  -8.5  0.21  -0.8 
1970-74 
11) 0.43 5.6 0.19  -12.9  0.11 -1.1 
1975-79  0.33 -2.4 0.23  -15.9  0.10 0.6 
1980-84  0.27 -6.7 0.19  -16.5  0.30 -1.5 
1985-89 0.26  -10.1  0.15  -14.6  0.50  -4.8 
1990-94 0.21  -11.7  0.09  -15.4  0.37  -3.4 
1995-99 0.21  -12.5  0.05  -18.5  0.42  -2.3 
  Total indicator of institutional sclerosis
15)
  Germany  Average of 20 OECD countries Average of 13 EU countries 
1995-1999  52 47 52 
1)  An exact definition and a documentation of the origin of the data is given by Nickell et. al. (2002) and Baker 
et. al. (2002).   17
   
2)  Index of employment protection legislation (0-2): 0 = low, 2 = high. 
3)  Benefit replacement rate before taxes as percentage of previous income before taxes. Average values for two 
income levels (100 % and 67 % of average income) and three family types (single, family with one earner, 
family with two earners), based on OECD-data. 
4)  Index of benefit duration: weighed arithmetic mean of benefit replacement ratios after 2 to 5 years in 
proportion to first year benefit replacement ratio (see 3). Based on OECD data. 
5)  Index of trade union density: employed union members as percentage of total employed. 
6)  Index of wage bargaining coordination (1-3): 1 = low, 3 = high. Based on OECD data. 
7)  Total average labour tax burden (payroll taxes, social security contributions, labour income tax, 
consumption taxes). 
8)  Except for benefit duration: West Germany. 
9)  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA. 
10) Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom. 
11) without Portugal. 
12) without Portugal, New Zealand und Norway. 
13) without Portugal and New Zealand 
14) without Australia and Neuseeland. 
15) arithmetic mean of the six single indicators previously scaled to the interval [0; 100]. 
Source: Baker et al. (2002); Nickell et. al. (2002); authors’ calculations.   18
   
Quite obviously the evolution of the indicators for Germany is not consistent with Germany’s 
economic development and is therefore in striking contrast to the institutional sclerosis view. 
If the latter were true one would expect the values for Germany to be very high in 
international comparison and increasing both absolutely and in international comparison over 
time, in particular during the 1990s when Germany entered its period of absolutely and 
comparatively unsatisfactory economic performance. However, only one indicator, the tax 
wedge, has consistently grown over time with considerable increases during the 1990s. This, 
however, can be explained in the first place by rising unemployment costs levied on labour 
and in the second place by the costs of German unification which were predominantly 
financed via the welfare system. Two indicators (bargaining coordination and benefit 
duration) have remained essentially constant since the mid 1970s. And three indicators have 
even decreased: Employment protection, the benefit replacement rate and union density have 
already been decreasing since the mid 1970s and have considerably been reduced further 
during the second half of the 1990s. 
The contradictions to the institutional sclerosis view become even more apparent when the 
indicators for Germany are compared with the average indicator values for 20 OECD and 13 
EU countries: In the second half of the 1990s two indicators for Germany (benefit 
replacement rate and union density) are lower than the OECD-20 average. In comparison to 
the EU-13 average, the former two indicators plus the tax wedge are below the average, 
though the values for the tax wedge are moving closer to the average. With respect to the 
German indicators above average, only for bargaining coordination the difference has 
increased during the last 15 years. For employment protection and benefit duration the 
difference to the OECD-20 and EU-13 average has been continually decreasing since the 
early (employment protection) or the late (benefit duration) 1970s. In order to capture the sum 
of all relevant indicators and their changes over time, an aggregate indicator for total 
institutional sclerosis has been built from the individual indicators for Germany, the EU-13 
and OECD-20. As was to be expected from the individual indicators, Germany´s total 
indicator in the second half of the 1990´s is a little above the OECD-20 average and exactly 
equal to the EU-13 average. 
In addition, Figure 10 relates the change in the indicator of total institutional sclerosis from 
the first half of the 1980s to the second half of the 1990s to the corresponding change in the 
unemployment rate for each of the 20 OECD countries. Obviously there is no positive relation 
between overall institutional change and the unemployment rate. The regression line has an 
insignificantly negative slope. Although Germany and Denmark have reduced their   19
„institutional sclerosis“ by almost the same amount (- 4 points) the German unemployment 
rate rose by about four percentage points whereas the Danish rate decreased by two points. On 
the other hand, the Netherlands, Portugal and Ireland were able to decrease their 
unemployment rates by about two percentage points despite of increasing sclerosis. To sum it 
up: On the basis of the data presented for Germany hardly any institutional change can be 
detected that could, according to the institutional sclerosis view, be made responsible for 
Germany’s poor economic performance since the mid 1990s. 
 
Figure 5: Change in the unemployment rate and the total index of instituional sclerosis 
from 1980/84 to 1995/99 (20 OECD countries)
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t-value = - 0,23
Source: Baker et al. (2002); authors' calculations.
 
4. A macroeconomic-policy story of Germany’s poor economic performance 
4.1 Theoretical foundations: Macroeconomic policy coordination as key to growth and 
employment 
A macroeconomic-policy story of Germany’s slump can both rely on Post-Keynesian as well 
as on New-Keynesian approaches.
11 These approaches reject the “(...) single-minded focus on 
                                                           
11 See Snowdon/Vane/Wynarczyk (1994, pp. 286-330, 367-380) for textbook reviews of the two approaches. 
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the labour market (which) stems from the naive belief that unemployment must be a defect in 
the labor market, as if the hole in a flat tire must always be on the bottom, because that is 
where the tire is flat“ (Solow (2000, p. 4). In the two modern Keynesian views monetary, 
fiscal and wage policies have a common responsibility for employment and price stability. In 
order to attain these goals the three policies have to be coordinated at least at the national,
12 
better even at the international level, in particular in currency areas with a common monetary 
policy.
13
In the Post-Keynesian approach the development of aggregate demand determines growth and 
employment in the short as well as in the long run.
14 Monetary policies’ interest rate setting 
and firms’ profit expectations essentially affect private investment which in turn is an 
essential determinant of effective demand and macroeconomic growth. Fiscal policy is also a 
central short and long run determinant of aggregate demand working both through the tax and 
the expenditure channel, in particular through public investment. And it is effective demand 
which via the level of aggregate output determines the level of employment realised in the 
labour market. The labour market, in this view, is a derived market because wage setting has 
no direct influence on employment. Instead, employment is determined by the interaction of 
the financial market where the interest rate is set - mainly by the policies of the central bank - 
and the goods market where total output is determined. Nominal wages set by labour unions 
and employers’ associations, however, are the crucial determinant of the price level and 
inflation: With labour productivity given or following an exogenous trend and mark-up 
pricing in incomplete goods markets, the nominal wage rate determines the price level when 
the mark-ups are constant. Whereas monetary and fiscal policies are capable of affecting 
effective demand and hence employment, wage policies are in charge of preventing 
cumulative inflation as well as deflation. Therefore, rigid wages have to provide the nominal 
anchor for the whole system of a monetary production economy. 
In New-Keynesian economics effective demand and hence monetary and fiscal policies have 
at least a short run impact on production and employment because prices and wages are 
 
12 A lot of papers have shown that a favourable coordination between monetary and fiscal policies rather than 
deregulated labour markets can be held responsible for the superior development of the US-economy during the 
1990s compared to Germany or the European economies (Flassbeck et. al., 1997; Holtfrerich, 1999; Kalmbach, 
2000; Palley, 1998; Solow, 2000). 
13 On the lack of sound macroeconomic policy coordination in the euro area as a reason for slow growth and high 
unemployment see Hein/Truger (2004, 2004a). 
14 See Davidson (1994), Heine/Herr (1999) and Lavoie (1992) for textbook presentations of the Post-Keynesian 
approach and Arestis (1996) for a survey.   21
   
                                                          
assumed to adjust rather slowly to their long-run equilibrium values.
15 In the long run 
equilibrium, however, unemployment is determined by the NAIRU (Non Accelerating 
Inflation Rate of Unemployment), which may depend on those structural factors discussed in 
section 2.1 - but the limitations discussed in section 2.2 have to be taken into account. In the 
short run, however, the exact duration of which is not clear, but which may be assumed to last 
at least a few years (Blanchard, 2003, p. 34), effective demand determines production and 
employment. From this it follows, that mainstream New-Keynesian implications for monetary 
and fiscal policies in the short run are rather similar to the Post-Keynesian approach: 
Monetary and fiscal policies are capable of stimulating demand and employment when the 
economy is in a slump and unemployment exceeds the NAIRU. Utmost importance is 
assigned as well to the coordination of the two policies (Blanchard, 2003, pp. 101-4 and pp. 
431-2).
16
With respect to wage policies, however, the New-Keynesian analysis differs substantially 
from the Post-Keynesian approach. In the short run, wage policy is strictly speaking not even 
a policy variable, because the short run is defined by exogenous and/or sticky nominal wages. 
And in the long run, wage policy is completely endogenous because mainstream models 
assume nominal wages adapting to the level consistent with the NAIRU (Blanchard, 2003, pp. 
113-33). Therefore, in contrast to the Post-Keynesian view, nominal wage moderation can be 
an effective way to accelerate the reduction of actual unemployment to the NAIRU-level. In 
New-Keynesian models, however, it is not clear how effective demand determining 
unemployment in the short run can adjust to the level of production associated with the 
NAIRU in the long run.
17 In order to have increasing effective demand when nominal wages 
and prices are falling in the face of unemployment above the NAIRU, either a real-balance-
effect has to be assumed. This requires the dominance of exogenous or outside money which 
is not the case in modern monetary production economies. Or, if we assume the dominance of 
endogenous money coming into existence via credit creation, symmetric monetary policy 
interventions are required (Allsopp/Vines, 1998). These may, however, not be sufficient to 
increase demand and employment when profit expectations are depressed and debt-deflation 
 
15 See Auerbach/Kotlikoff (1998), Blanchard (2003), Mankiw (2002) and Stiglitz (1997a) for textbook 
presentations in the New-Keynesian vain and Truger (2003) for a survey on macroeconomic policy implications. 
16 The requirement of coordinated monetary and fiscal policy intervention increases considerably if hysteresis is 
taken into account. With hysteresis the NAIRU is not stable but rather depends on the past development of the 
actual unemployment rate which can be affected by macro-policies (Ball, 1999; Blanchard, 2003, p. 283). 
17 For a critique of the New-Keynesian NAIRU approach from a Post-Keynesian pespective see Sawyer (2001, 
2002) and Hein (2004).   22
   
                                                          
works its way through the private sector. Because of these considerations we prefer the Post-
Keynesian view of rigid nominal wages as a macroeconomic stabilizer rather than the New-
Keynesian view of nominal wages as an adjustment variable to the long-run equilibrium. 
4.2 The impact of macroeconomic policy variables: empirical indicators 
In order to analyse whether macroeconomic policies, i.e. monetary, fiscal and wage policies, 
can be made responsible for Germany’s slump, empirical indicators for these factors have to 
be chosen. In this section the indicators used in the subsequent empirical analysis are 
introduced. We concentrate on those indicators for which a direct influence on GDP growth 
can be assumed according to the theoretical background sketched in the previous section, 
because growth can be considered the key to the understanding of the course of 
unemployment and budged deficits. 
The effects of monetary policies can be assessed by the short-term real interest rate. The 
policy instrument is certainly the short-term nominal interest rate which can rather directly be 
controlled by the central bank. As the Bundesbank and the ECB since 1999 have (implicitly 
or explicitly) targeted inflation they must have conducted their policies with an eye to the 
concomitant changes in the short-term real interest rate. Changes in this rate then exert inverse 
effects on GDP growth via different transmission channels:
18 An increase in the short-term 
real interest rate has an immediate restrictive effect on those demand components which are 
short-term financed. As an increase in the short-term interest rate also causes a tendency 
towards increasing long-term interest rates via arbitrage and expectation effects, investment as 
a key factor for growth will be negatively affected as well. In addition to these interest rate 
channel effects, negative asset price effects (credit channel) and potentially upward currency 
revaluations (exchange rate channel) have to be taken into account. The effects of interest rate 
changes will usually be subject to significant time lags of about one year. 
Wage setting affects growth via its effects on unit labour cost growth and inflation as sketched 
above.
19 If nominal wages increase at a faster pace than productivity plus the price level do, 
unit labour cost growth and inflation will speed up. This will cause real interest rates to fall 
and may make the central bank increase nominal interest rates in order to reach its inflation 
target. If nominal wages increase at a rate below the sum of productivity growth and inflation 
rate, unit labour cost growth will slow down and cause disinflation. Finally, deflation may be 
 
18 For an overview see Cecchetti (1995) and Bernanke/Gertler (1995). See Bondt (2000) for the relative 
importance of the different transmission mechanisms in European countries. 
19 See Arestis/Sawyer (2003) and Hein (2002, 2004) for models of distribution conflict and inflation.   23
   
                                                          
the consequence. Deflation causes increasing real interest rates and rising real debts with 
negative effects on investment and growth. If deflationary processes have started, lowering 
interest rates may be ineffective. Wage policies, however, may not only affect prices, but may 
also change distribution if firms do not completely pass unit labour cost variations to prices. 
Under these conditions nominal wage moderation causes the labour income share to fall.
20
Hypothetically, the effects of income shares on GDP growth are ambiguous 
(Bhaduri/Marglin, 1990). With the propensity to save out of wages falling short of the savings 
propensity out of profits, a falling labour income share means a cut-back in consumption with 
directly contractive effects on investment and GDP growth. A fall in labour income shares 
that is associated with nominal wage restraint would, on the other hand, improve international 
competitiveness and, therefore, stimulate demand for exports, investment and growth. With a 
slowdown in inflation, the central bank may also cut interest rates and stimulate investment 
and growth. Finally, a falling labour income share is associated with rising unit profits which 
may also improve investment and growth. Since the stimulating effects of wage moderation 
and declining labour income shares for investment and growth are rather indirect and 
uncertain, the direct and contractive effects may dominate and the relation between the labour 
income share and GDP growth may be (slightly) positive - or insignificant. Nominal wage 
hikes according to the sum of productivity growth and inflation and hence constant labour 
income shares should be favourable conditions for growth. 
In order to capture the effects of fiscal policies at least two alternative measures can be used. 
As a first approximation for the overall effects the annual change in the structural primary 
government deficit ratio (PDR) can be consulted. Using primary deficits allows us to focus on 
those components of public debt directly connected to effective demand. By using cyclically 
adjusted data and relating them to potential GDP, the attempt is made to exclude the cyclical 
effects of automatic stabilisers on the budget deficit. This makes it possible – if only in an 
imperfect way – to view the budget deficit as an exogenous policy variable affecting demand 
and growth. An increase in the PDR will have an adverse effect on real GDP growth and vice 
versa. A second important indicator for fiscal policies is the annual growth rate of real 
government investment. In the short run government investment is an essential component of 
aggregate demand. Moreover it provides public infrastructure making it a key condition for 
 
20 Empirical analysis for Germany and the EMU in the 1990s has shown, that the development of unit labour 
costs determines the development of output prices (Hein/Schulten/Truger, 2004). Falling unit labour cost growth 
rates, however, are not accompanied by proportionally falling inflation rates. Therefore, nominal wage 
moderation is also associated with a tendency of labour income shares to fall.   24
   
                                                          
growth also in the long run. In contrast to the PDR the endogeneity of which can never fully 
be excluded, public investment is a variable effectively under the government’s control. We 
assume a positive relationship between its growth rate and GDP growth.
21
In Hein/Truger (2004) and Truger/Hein (2002) we have used pooled least square regressions 
with annual data for 11 EMU countries in the period from 1981 to 2001 in order to verify 
whether the macro-policy indicators sketched above have had a statistically significant impact 
on GDP growth in these countries. The estimated coefficients for the real short-term interest 
rate, the labour income share, the PDR or the growth rate of real government investment all 
have the expected signs and are statistically significant, predominantly at the 1 per cent level. 
Therefore, the regression results do not contradict the theoretical claims made above with 
respect to the growth effects of the macroeconomic policy variables. 
4.3 Causes of the German crisis: Restrictive and ill-coordinated macroeconomic policies 
In the previous sections it has been argued that monetary, fiscal and wage policies are 
important for the explanation of GDP growth both from a theoretical and from an empirical 
point of view. However, in order to provide an explanation for the German slump, it must be 
shown, that the expected impact of macroeconomic policy variables is indeed consistent with 
the German data. In order to provide a macroeconomic explanation for Germany’s decline to 
“Europe’s sick man”, it must be shown that monetary, fiscal and wage policies for Germany 
have indeed been less favourable than for the EMU average since the mid 1990s.
22 We should 
therefore expect German real interest rates to be higher, German wage policies to be too 
moderate causing below average inflation rates and falling labour income shares, and German 
fiscal policies to be more restrictive and/or public investment growth to be lower. In what 
follows it will be shown that these conditions are met to a considerable extent. Thus, 




21 At least for Germany long-term positive growth effects of public infrastructure investment should be 
uncontroversial. See Kitterer (1998) and Pfähler et al. (1996). 
22 It should be noted, that using the EMU average as a standard of reference does by no means imply that 
macroeconomic policies for the EMU have been optimal or adequate. On the contrary, EMU macroeconomic 
policies have in general suffered from the same problems as Germany: macroeconomic mismanagement and a 
lack of coordination (Hein/Truger, 2004). Unfortunately German macroeconomic policies have even been worse. 
23 There is a fourth macroeconomic factor that is not explicitly addressed in the current paper, but that is 
nevertheless particularly suited to explaining the extraordinarily pronounced fall in relative German economic 
performance in 2001 and the subsequent years: The German economy depends considerably stronger on cyclical   25
   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
With respect to monetary policies, Germany has lost its former status as the key currency 
country within the EMS at the start of EMU in 1999. Since then it has no longer been in a 
position to reap the advantages of lower interest rates it used to have compared to the other 
EMS countries. During the process of convergence these countries gained from a considerable 
decrease of short- and long-term nominal interest rates towards the lower German level. This 
convergence and decrease in nominal interest rates was associated with a stronger decrease in 
real interest rates for the EMU average than for Germany over the 1990s (Figure 6). Since the 
German inflation rate is lower than the EMU average and the nominal interest rates have 
almost completely converged since 1999, Germany’s real interest rates have even been higher 
than the EMU average since then (Figure 7). Thus, Germany currently suffers more from the 
ECB’s monetary policies than the other EMU countries, because the uniform monetary policy 
addresses average EMU inflation and cannot take into account Germany’s special economic 
situation with both a higher output gap and lower inflation than the EMU average.
24
 
fluctuations of the US economy than the other EMU countries (SVR, 2001, pp. 251-266). This is true for the 
dependence of German exports on US demand, the stronger correlation between German and US share price 
indices and the transmission of cyclical fluctuations via direct foreign investment. Furthermore, the transmission 
of negative cyclical shocks from the US to Germany seems to be stronger than that of positive ones. 
24 For a general critique of the ECB’s “anti-growth bias” see Bibow (2002) and Hein (2002). This “anti-growth”-
bias consists of a too restrictive definition of price stability for the heterogeneous currency area - as an annual 
increase of the harmonised consumer price index of below but close to 2 percent - and an asymmetric response to 
the expected deviation of actual from target inflation. The ECB has tended to tighten whenever inflation 
increased above the target without relaxing when inflation expectations came down.   26
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Figure 9: Labour invome share in Germany and the EMU, in % of GDP at 
factor costs (1981-2003)


























   
Germany’s below average inflation rate is caused by too moderate nominal wage increases: 
Unit labour cost growth and inflation have been considerably below the EMU average since 
the late 1990s (Figures 7 and 8). However, this has also been true for the 1980s when 
Germany’s absolute and relative economic performance had been much better. But during the   28
   
                                                          
1980s low unit labour cost growth and the resulting low inflation rates were the basis for the 
Deutschmark’s status as the regional key currency within the EMS, allowing the German 
Bundesbank to set substantially lower nominal and actually real interest rates than in the other 
EMS countries. Since the beginning of the interest rate convergence process in the mid 1990s 
and with the completion of EMU in 1999, however, lower inflation rates for Germany do no 
longer pay offs in terms of lower interest rates. 
The too moderate wage setting in Germany did not only cause below average inflation rates. 
This wage policy also contributed to the continuing tendency of a declining labour income 
share which already started in the early 1980s (Figure 9).
25 Germany’s labour income share 
has been below EMU average during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s as well. By the 
mid 1990s, however, the gap to the EMU average was almost closed but continued to widen 
afterwards. This means that during the EMU convergence process German wage policies have 
been less successful than those in the other EMU countries in exhausting the scope for 
distribution, the sum of productivity growth and inflation. As a consequence German 
domestic demand has been weaker than in the EMU as a whole, which further contributed to 
Germany’s poor economic performance during the second half of the 1990s. In 2000/2001 
Germany’s labour income share exceeded the EMU average. This was due to the more 
pronounced growth and productivity slowdown in Germany than in the EMU on average.
26 
Since 2002 the German labour income share has again been falling behind and has weakened 
domestic demand. On the other hand, however, moderate wage policies have improved price 
competitiveness and profitability of German firms which made German export surpluses 
almost triple between 2000 and 2003. Germany’s share in international trade improved 
making Germany the ‘world champion’ in exports in 2003. But this extraordinary export 
performance was insufficient to compensate for the associated deficiencies in domestic 
demand. 
Considering fiscal policies, the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
have led to budget consolidation and restrictive policies all over Europe. In order to correctly 
assess whether fiscal policies have been economically adequate, the change in the structural 
primary balance in relation to the change in the output gap is considered (Figures 10 and 11). 
From this it can be seen that German fiscal policies during the period from 1995 until 2003 
 
25 The European Commission (2003) defines the labour income share as “compensation per employee as 
percentage of GDP at factor cost per person employed”. 
26 As is well known, labour income shares tend to increase in economic downswing and to decrease in upswings 
due to pro-cyclical productivity growth and time-lags in nominal wage setting.   29
has been restrictive in three years (positive change in the PDR) in face of a slowdown in 
economic activity (negative change in the output gap): In 1996, 1997 and 2003 fiscal policies 
pro-cyclically worsened the crisis. For the EMU average, this has happened once in 1996 and 
also slightly in 2003. 
 
Figure 10: Change in structural primary balance and in the output gap in % of 
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Figure 11: Change in the structural primary balance and in the 
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The restrictive stance of German fiscal policies becomes much clearer if one considers the 
growth rates of real public investment as the key component of government expenditure with 
respect to economic growth.
27 Since the mid 1990s German public investment growth rate is 
below the EMU average. The decline in public investment has led to a share of real public 
investment in real GDP which is very low, both in absolute terms and in comparison with the 
EMU average (Figure 12): After almost reaching the EMU level of about 2.8 per cent of GDP 
during the early 1990s it has continually decreased to only about 1.8 per cent compared to 2.5 
per cent in the EMU as a whole in 2003. 
 
                                                           
27 Also the growth rates of primary government expenditure have been below the EMU average since 1997. The 
same is even true for the growth rates of real social benefits. 
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To summarise the empirical comparison: Macroeconomic policy variables have indeed been 
less favourable in Germany than in the EMU since the mid 1990s. Macroeconomic 
mismanagement, therefore, can be considered to be the main cause of Germany’s slump. 
5. Summary and economic policy implications 
The economic policy implications from the analysis in this paper are quite straightforward: As 
institutional sclerosis, i.e. rigid labour markets and generous welfare state institutions, can 
neither from a theoretical nor from a empirical perspective be made responsible for 
Germany’s economic crisis since the 1990s, the claims for radical deregulation of the labour 
market and dismantling the welfare state in order to decrease unemployment are deeply 
misguided.
28 To further pursue and intensify this strategy would risk getting a negative payoff 
in terms of employment and growth at the cost of a substantial weakening of employees’ 
                                                           
28 This is not to say that there is no need for reforms or no scope for improving the existing institutions. For 
example ageing societies certainly pose a challenge for the welfare state that has to be addressed. However, this 
has nothing to do with the current crisis and is far from implying that deregulating the labour market, 
dismantling the welfare state or other supply side measures are automatically the best answers to these 
challenges.  
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rights and a substantially more uneven income distribution. As long as the macroeconomic 
causes of the German economic crisis are not recognized and addressed accordingly, the 
situation will not improve at all - or it might only slightly improve by accident due to 
favourable external circumstances like a strong recovery of the world economy. In order to 
improve its macroeconomic performance, the German economy needs a more expansive 
monetary policy at the euro area level, less moderate wage setting exhausting the scope for 
distribution and more active and expansive fiscal policies. This, however, requires major 
changes in particular in the European economic policy framework, i.e. a change in the ECB’s 
monetary strategy, a reform of the SGP and more favourable conditions for wage policy co-
ordination across the euro area.
29
 
29 See Hein/Truger (2004, 2004a) for a more explicit discussion on this.   33
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